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MAINTENANCE CONTRACTORS

HERE WERE ONLY a handful of cases in the past year deal-

ing with the government contractor defense. Only one
made it to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals level. In

348
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Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron,Army pilots who were involved
in a helicopter crash sued the manufacturer, alleging that the
crash was caused by the tail fin's separation, which resulted from
a crack originating near the base of the fin spar.' Plaintiffs
sought to recover against DynCorp, who was contracted to maintain the Army's aircraft. 2 Although cracks had been discovered
in the UH-1 line of helicopters and had become the subject of
both a 1997 Airworthiness Directive issued by the FAA and a
1998 Advisory Bulletin by Bell Helicopters, the Army chose not
to follow those recommendations as it is not bound by either the
FAA's issuance of Airworthiness Directives or the manufacturer's Service Bulletins.' Bell, the manufacturer, warned the
Army about the possibility of such cracks and recommended additional visual inspections.4 The Army determined that its helicopters were not engaged in heavy lifting; therefore, they did
not need to follow the recommended inspection protocols.5
Plaintiffs alleged "that DynCorp was negligent under Alabama
law for failing to properly maintain the helicopter and/or to
make necessary repairs."6 DynCorp moved for summary judgment on the basis of the government contractor defense. 7 The
circuit court affirmed the district court's decision that the government contractor defense extends to service contracts such as
the maintenance contract between DynCorp and the Army.'
This case merits review as it provides an excellent summary as to
the admissibility of expert testimony and affidavits in support of
and in opposition to a summary judgment.

B.

APPLICATION TO FEDERAL OFFICER JURISDICTION

In Teague v. Bell Helicopter Services, Inc., the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, while considering
a petition to remand the case back to state court, held that the
potential application of the government contractor defense was
sufficient to create federal jurisdiction and avoid remand.9 In
this case, an employee's survivors filed suit against the dece1 328 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003).
2

Id. at 1331.

3 Id.
4 Id.

5 Id. a 1331-32.
6 Id. at 1332.
7

Id.

8 Id. at 1345.
11No. 4:03-CV-004-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2088, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12,
2003).
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dent's employer, Bell Helicopter, alleging that his death was
caused, in part, by exposure to asbestos during his employment.1" Pursuant to a contract with the government, "Bell used
asbestos in the process of manufacturing military helicopters."'1
The decedent was exposed to that asbestos while working for
Bell Helicopters.' 2 Textron removed the case under "federal officer" removal jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (a) (1) to which
Bell agreed.1" Textron had to show "that Bell: (1) [was] a 'person' within the meaning of the statute; (2) 'acted pursuant to a
federal officer's directions and that a causal nexus exist[ed] between the defendant's actions under color of federal office and
the plaintiff s claims'; and (3) assert[ed] a 'colorable federal defense."'"4 The court found that Bell met the first two requirements and then examined whether Bell sufficiently presented a
federal defense.' 5 The court held that in order to avoid remand, Bell only needed to provide a "colorable federal defense." It did not need to prove the asserted defense, but only
to articulate its apparent applicability to the case before the
6
court.'
C.

WAIVER OF DEFENSE

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana held that the failure to timely plead the government
contractor defense as an affirmative defense in accordance with
Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes a
waiver.' 7 In New OrleansAssets v. Woodward, the defendant failed
to formally plead the government contractor defense in accordance with Rule 8(c), even though it had filed answers to the
plaintiffs original and amended complaints, a co-defendant's
cross-claim, the plaintiffs second, third, and fifth amended
complaints and a supplemental and amended cross-complaint."8
Additionally, the defense was not raised as an issue in arguments
over summary judgment. 19 The defendant first attempted to as10 Id.

at *2.

11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.

14 Id. at *3.
15 Id. at *3, *11.
16 Id. at *12-13.

17 New Orleans Assets v. Woodward, No. 01-2171, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3382,
at *6 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 2003).
18 Id. at *4.

19 Id. at *4 n.1.
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sert the defense "on the final day which motions could be filed
in compliance with [the] Court's Scheduling Order, and just
one week before the discovery cut-off date. '20 The defendant
failed to produce any evidence showing that the facts supporting
the affirmative defense were only discovered recently. 21 Based
on the foregoing, the court held that the defense was waived. 2
II.

FEDERAL AVIATION ACT

A.

PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania had the opportunity to consider whether or not
the Federal Aviation Act applied to a passenger's claim for injury resulting from items falling from an overhead bin.2 3 In Allen v. American Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff was injured when a
computer fell from an overhead bin after arrival at the gate.24
The bin was opened by an unidentified passenger who stood up
while the seatbelt light was still on, but after the aircraft had
come to a stop at the terminal gate.25 The plaintiff contended
that American Airlines was negligent because it operated the aircraft in a careless and reckless manner contrary to the requirements of 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) by: failing to require the
unidentified passenger to remain seated; failing to give a postlanding warning; and allowing the overhead compartments to
be overloaded. 26 The court noted that the Third Circuit has
held that the Federal Aviation Act "establishes the applicable
standard of care in the field of air safety, generally, [and] thus
preempt[s] the entire field from state and territorial regulation." 27 While the court found that allegations of negligence
based on Section 91.13 sufficiently alleged a federal standard of
care, the court also found that the regulation did not require
the defendant to provide a warning immediately prior to disembarking. 28 This was based, in part, on 14 C.F.R. § 91.519,
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5-6.
22 Id. at *6.
23 See Allen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 370 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
24 Id. at 373.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 374-75.
27 Id. at 374 (citing Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir.
1999)).
28 Id. at 375.
20

21
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which only requires a pre-takeoff warning. 29 Since there was no
breach of a federal standard of care, the defendant was entitled
to summary judgment on that cause of action."0 Of interest, the
court analyzed other cases which have considered the application of Section 91.13(a) to the conduct of air carriers and found
that application of Section 91.13(a) is reserved only for serious
misconduct where a potential for harm is incontestably high. 1
Here the court noted that the aircraft was at a stop and there
was simply no "threat of imminent, dire physical injury to Plaintiff and his fellow passengers while their plane sat stationary. '"32
This opinion briefly summarized several cases, facts, and issues
that courts have looked at to determine whether or not the carrier may be liable for injuries as a result of objects falling from
overhead bins. 3
In a case that is close to home, specifically mine, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida considered whether the Federal Aviation Act, which governes all qualifications and capacity to operate commercial aircraft in
interstate commerce, preempted state criminal laws. 34 Hughes v.
11thJudicialCircuitinvolved two America West Airline pilots who
were assigned as the crew on a commercial flight from Miami,
Florida to Phoenix, Arizona. 5 Shortly after pushback, officers
from the Miami-Dade police department asked the Transportation Security Administration for permission to stop the flight
and have it return to the gate on the basis that officials at a security checkpoint smelled alcohol on the pilots' breath. 6 The
aircraft was recalled, and approximately two hours later, the
Miami-Dade police department took the pilots' breathalyzer
test.37 Their breath-alcohol level exceeded the 0.08 limit of Florida law, but was less than the federal criminal limit of 0.10.38
"America West permanently fired [both pilots], and the Federal
Aviation Administration permanently revoked their Airman and
Medical Certificates. ' 39 The State of Florida sought to prosecute
Id.
Id. at 378.
31 Id. at 376.
32 Id. at 377.
33 Id. at 377-78.
34 See Hughes v. llthJud. Cir., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
35 Id. at 1336.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1336-37.
38 Id. at 1337.
29

30

39 Id.
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the pilots criminally for having operated an aircraft with an alcohol level in excess of the 0.08 state limit.4" The court did a detailed analysis of whether it should abstain from interfering with
the state court prosecutions, but ultimately decided that federal
abstention was inappropriate.4 1 In analyzing whether or not
there was federal preemption, the court noted that there are
three situations where preemption can arise: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption.4 2 "Field preemption exists where either: (1) the pervasiveness of the federal
regulation precludes supplementation by the States; (2) the federal interest in the field is sufficiently dominant; or (3) the object the federal law seeks to obtain and the character of
obligations federal law imposes reveal the same purpose."4 The
court determined that the comprehensive legislation provided
under the U.S. Code and the Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.) evidenced Congress's intent "to preempt the field of
pilot qualifications and capacity to fly a commercial airliner in
interstate commerce. ' 44 Additionally, the court noted that 14
C.F.R. expressly preempts state law except where there has been
"actual loss of life, injury, or damage to property. '45 As a result
of the court's decision that the Federal Aviation Act preempted
this specific area, the court issued a writ of habeas corpus and
enjoined the State of Florida from criminally prosecuting the
pilots.4 6
B.

No

PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW

In Casey v. Goulian, the court considered whether the Federal
Aviation Act sufficiently preempted plaintiffs' state law nuisance
claims alleging that the defendants were involved in noisy and
dangerous stunt plane flights over their homes.4 7 The court
noted that the Federal Aviation Act does not provide a private
cause of action to enforce its standards nor does it completely
preempt the field of noise regulation.48 Citing Vorhees v. Naper
Aero Club, Inc., the court found that "[t]here is no . . .broad
40

Id,

Id. at 1339-40.
Id. at 1341.
43 Id. at 1342.
41
42

4- Id. at 1343.

45 Id. at 1344 (citing 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App I, § XI (B)).
46

Id. at 1346.

47 273 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D. Mass. 2003).
48

Id. at 138.
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language in the Federal Aviation Act specifically prohibiting
state and local governments from regulating airflight in any way
whatsoever," and as a result, there is no complete preemption of
the field so as to allow removal of the state law claim based upon
federal question grounds.4 9
III.

DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT

The only aviation case dealing with the Death on the High
Seas Act (DOHSA) was an offshoot of the Egypt Air crash of
1999. In the case of Allen v. Egypt Air, Inc., the court found that
a decedent's stepchildren were not entitled to recover under
DOHSA as "a stepchild does not qualify as a 'child' under
DOHSA."5 0 The court further determined that none of the
stepchildren qualified as dependent relatives under DOHSA
(no claim was made that the stepchildren were financially dependent upon the decedent), and as a result, the court held
they were not entitled to assert claims under DOHSA.5 1
IV.

AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT

Only two cases made it to the circuit court level dealing with
the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA).52 The Act was germane to
a half dozen district court decisions.

A.

PREEMPTION OF STATE LAw

In KingJewelry Inc. v. FederalExpress Corp., King Jewelry sought
to recover for damage to a shipment of candelabra.5 3 The
candelabra were valued at $37,000. 5 ' King Jewelry had contracted with a professional packager in Florida to package and
ship the candelabra. 55 The shipper then contracted with Federal Express when other companies refused to ship such high
value items.5 6 Federal Express told the shipper that he could
pay an extra $185 for the declared value of $37,000. 57 The extra
- Id. at 139-40 (citing Vorhees v. Naper Aero Club, Inc., 272 F.3d 390, 404
(7th Cir. 2001)).
50 Allen v. Egypt Air, Inc. (In reAir Crash Near Nantucket Island), No. 02-CV00101, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13877, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2003).
51 Id. at *6, *8.
52 49 U.S.C. § 410701 (2004).
53 316 F.3d 961, 962 (9th Cir. 2003).
54 Id. at 962.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.

354

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

value was paid to Federal Express. 58 However, the air waybill
provided that the highest allowed declared value was $50,000,
except that "items of extraordinary value" were limited to a declared value of $ 5 0 0 .51 "Items of extraordinary value" were defined in FedEx's Service Guide and referenced and
incorporated into the air waybill.6" "Items of extraordinary
value" were defined to include items such as artwork, jewelry,
furs, precious metal, and negotiable instruments.61 When the
candelabra arrived damaged, King Jewelry filed suit in California state court, and the case was removed to federal court by
Federal Express.6 2 Federal Express then "moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit its liability to $500.00 per
crate.

' 63

King Jewelry alleged the $500 per crate limit was inap-

plicable because the parties amended the contract under California law (presumably due to the payment for the additional
declared value).64

The circuit court determined that the ADA preempted California law, thereby preventing modification of the air waybill between the parties.65 The court held that "federal common law
governs contractual clauses that limit interstate carriers' liability
for damage to goods shipped by air. '66 The court also found

that the ADA preempts state law because "the modification that
King Jewelry [sought] to impose pertains directly to the services
Federal Express offers. '67 Of note, when the court held that the
ADA preempted King Jewelry's state law claims, it also required
Federal Express to return the excess premium paid for the declared value in excess of $500 per crate.68
In a case involving Florida's Whistleblower Act (FWA)6 9 , the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
considered whether or not the ADA preempted a plaintiffs
58 Id.

at 962-63.

59 Id.
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 963.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 964, see 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2004).
KingJewelery, 316 F.3d at 964.
Id.
Id. at 964 n.8.
Id. at 966.
FLA. STAT. § 448.102(1) (2004).
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claim.7" In Tucker v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., the plaintiff was
terminated from his employment at an aircraft parts repair facility that held an FAA certified repair station certificate.71 The
plaintiff was supposedly terminated due to workplace misconduct, although the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated due
to his complaints that his employer was not properly repairing
parts in accordance with the Federal Aviation Regulations and
was not properly filling out required FAA paperwork. 2 The
plaintiffs ex-employer moved for summary judgment on the basis that the ADA preempted the FWA claim and that the ADA's
Whistleblower Protection Program 73 provided the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs claim. 4 Finally, the employer argued that
a claim under the Whistleblower Protection Program was timebarred because the plaintiff had failed to file a complaint with
the Department of Labor within 90 days as required by the
Act.

75

The court determined that, while an aircraft could fly with
one generator not working (which was the type of part principally repaired by the plaintiffs employer), the "aircraft generator maintenance [was] sufficiently related to air carrier service"
as to be preempted by the ADA. 76 The court then found that
the Whistleblower Protection Program incorporated into the
ADA was applicable, but that the plaintiff had failed to file a
timely complaint, and therefore, the plaintiff's claim was timebarred under the Whistleblower Protection Program.77
In yet another case involving FWA, the District Court of New
Hampshire held that the Florida Whistleblower Act was preempted by the ADA.7 8 In Simonds v. Pan American Airlines, the
plaintiff filed suit in Florida state court claiming he was discharged in violation of Florida's Whistleblower Act.79 Pan Am

removed the proceeding to the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida where it was thereafter transferred
70 Tucker v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla.
2003).
71 Id. at 1361.
72 Id.

73 49 U.S.C. § 42127.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1362-63.

Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1365.
78 Simonds v. Pan Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 03-11-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17328, at *17 (D.N.H. Sept. 30, 2003).
79 Id. at *1; FLA. STAT. § 448.102(1).
76
77
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to the District of New Hampshire.8" Pan Am then moved to dismiss the claim on the basis that the ADA preempted the plaintiff's claim.8 1 "Simonds [was] an experienced commercial pilot,
with approximately 20,000 hours of flight time. '"82 He was
scheduled to fly a four-leg flight from New Hampshire to Maine
to Pittsburgh to Florida and then back to Portsmouth, New
Hampshire.13 "The entire trip should have required approximately eight hours of flight time and 13 and one-half hours of
duty time."8 4 The Federal Aviation Regulations preclude a pilot
from being assigned or accepting an assignment of a schedule
that requires duty for more than sixteen hours in any twentyfour hour period.8 5 Due to unexpected aircraft mechanical
problems after the first three legs of the trip, it appeared to Simonds that he would not be able to complete the trip without
running afoul of the 16 hour limit.8 6 Based on the foregoing,
he reported his concerns to Pan Am and refused to fly the last
leg of the flight.8 7 As a result, the flight was delayed until another pilot took over the flight.88
The court analyzed whether or not the ADA would preempt
the Florida Whistleblower Act claim under these facts.8 " The
court cited the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Branche v. Airtran
Airways, and noted that it is the specific facts of a retaliation
claim and not the statute that determines whether or not the
claim is preempted by the ADA.9 0 The court also found that the
ADA's incorporation of the Whistleblower Protection Program
evidenced Congress's intent "to preempt state-law whistleblower
claims related to air safety."9 1 The court determined that the
plaintiff's conduct in refusing to fly the aircraft put in jeopardy
the air carrier's ability to render "service" to its passengers by

goSimonds, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17328, at *1.
81
82
83
84

Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id.

85 Id.

Id.
Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90Id.
91Id.
86
87

at *4-5.
at *5.
at *11.
(citing Branch v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003)).
at *14 (citing Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 286 F.3d 488, 496 (8th Cir. 2002)).
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threatening to ground the plane. 92 As such, his claim was pre93
empted by the ADA.
B.

No

PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW

In Skydive Factory, Inc. v. Maine Aviation Corp., the plaintiff filed
suit for property damage suffered after landing as a result of
"defendants' improper inspection and maintenance of the airplane."9 4 The defendant removed the suit to federal court on
federal question grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 asserting "that
the Federal Aviation Act completely preempts any state-law
cause of action for inspection and maintenance."9 5 Upon plaintiff's motion to remand, the court noted that "[t]he FAA ha[d]
promulgated regulations that deal with aircraft maintenance
and inspection, 14 C.F.R. pt. 43 [and] prescrib[ed] the qualifications for who can do them and how they are to be done."9 6
Nonetheless, citing American Airlines v. Wolens, the court found
that terms and conditions in a contract between parties, as opposed to a state law or regulation, are not preempted by the
Federal Aviation Regulations.9 7 While that case dealt with property damage, as opposed to personal injury, the court found no
reason to distinguish between the two, and, noting that other
courts have found that safety-related claims for personal injury
were not preempted, found no basis for preemption of claims
dealing solely with property damage.9" As a result, the case was
remanded for lack of federal question jurisdiction.9 9
In Branche v. Air Tran Airways, Inc., the court considered
whether the Airline Deregulation Act preempted Florida's
Whistleblower Act (FWA). °° Mr. Branche worked for Air Tran
as their only aircraft inspector at Tampa International Airport. 10 1 In this capacity, he was required to conduct safety inspections of Air Tran's aircraft after they had been serviced by
1 2
Air Tran's maintenance crew prior to takeoff.
92

Id. at *17.

93 Id.

94 268 F. Supp. 2d 61, 62 (D. Me. 2003).
95 Id.

Id.
97 Id. (citing Am. Airlines, Inc., v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 229 (1995)).
96

Id. at 62-63.
99Id. at 65.
100 342 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2003); FLA.
l0, Id.
98

102

Id.

STAT.

§ 448.102(1) (2004).
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In 2001, one of Air Tran's DC-9 aircraft landed at the airport
with one of its two engines running at temperatures exceeding
FAA safety guidelines.' ° The plaintiff recommended that the
engine be subjected to a detailed physical inspection. 10 4 Instead, one of Air Tran's maintenance personnel and two maintenance workers climbed into the aircraft and conducted a high
power run in an effort to ascertain the airworthiness of the engine.10 5 The plaintiff alleged "that none of these individuals
''
were qualified to undertake this diagnostic maneuver.""6
After
the aircraft departed Tampa without the recommended service,
"the engine overheated during its flight to Atlanta and the plane
subsequently was taken out of service.' 0 7 Mr. Branche reported
Air Tran's alleged regulatory violations to the FAA.'0 8 Both he
and Air Tran were contacted regarding his allegations, and Air
Tran realized that he was the source of the FAA's knowledge of
the incidents in question.10 9 Approximately two weeks later, Air
Tran accused Mr. Branche of falsifying his time card and stealing approximately two hours of pay, and he was terminated."0
As a result, Mr. Branche filed suit in Florida state court under
the FWA."'
Air Tran removed the case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction." 2 The district court granted the motion for removal and
also granted Air Tran's motion for summary judgment on the
basis that the plaintiffs FWA Claim was preempted by the
ADA." 3 On appeal the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[p]re-emption may be either express or implied, and is compelled whether
Congress's command is explicitly stated in the statute's language
or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."'1 4 On appeal the Eleventh Circuit noted that the ADA expressly states
that a state "may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price,
103
104

105

Id.
Id.
Id.

106 Id.
107
108

Id. at 1252.
Id.

109 Id.
110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id.

Id. at 1253 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383
(1992) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1990))).
114
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route, or service of an air carrier .... ,I
The court considered
whether Branche's claim under the Whistleblower Act was preempted because it had the effect of regulating services provided
by Air Tran. n 6 The court made a careful analysis of other opinions on whether retaliatory discharge claims were preempted by
the ADA and ultimately concluded that this claim was not preempted by the ADA." 7 The court's reasoning was that safety is
not a basis on which airlines compete for passengers, and as
such, it does not serve the purposes of the ADA to preempt state
law employment claims related to safety."' Because Branche's
FWA claim was fundamentally an employment discrimination
claim and did not impact any area in which airlines compete,
the court concluded that his claim did not relate to "services" of
the air carrier within the meaning of the Act.' 19 The court went
on to note that in 1999 Congress amended the ADA to include
the Whistleblower Protection Program (WPP), which provided
similar protection to Florida's Whistleblower Act.' 2° The court
noted that Air Tran fired the plaintiff because he had reported a
violation to the FAA.' 21 This did not affect the providing of services by Air Tran. 2 2 Had the plaintiff claimed that Air Tran
fired him in retaliation for refusing to allow an aircraft to take
off, the court would have likely ruled that state law, under those
12
facts, did affect services. 1
In Alasady v. Northwest Airlines Corp., plaintiffs brought claims
I24
against Northwest alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act
and the Minnesota Human Rights Act 1 25 , as well as tort claims

1 26
for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The claims arose out of Northwest's refusal to allow the three
plaintiffs, all Muslim men of Middle Eastern descent, to board a
flight from Minneapolis to Salt Lake City on September 20,
2001, just nine days after the events of September 11th. 1 27 Al-

Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)(2004)).
Id. at 1253-54.
117 Id. at 1259-60.
118 Id. at 1258.
119 Id. at 1261.
115
116

120
121
122
123
124

125
126
127

Id.

Id. at 1263.
Id.
See id.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (2004).
MINN. STAT. Ann. § 363.03 (2004).
No. 02-3669, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3841, at *1-2 (D. Minn. Mar. 3, 2003).
Id. at *1.
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though the plaintiffs had been fully interviewed by both state
and federal officers and were considered to pose no security
threat, the crew and passengers on Northwest's flight refused to
fly the aircraft with them on board.12 Plaintiffs were ultimately
provided alternate travel with Delta Airlines after a nearly fourhour delay. 129 The court noted that the purpose of the ADA was
to maximize reliance on competitive market forces to further
the efficiency, innovation, and low prices of air transportation
services. 3 0 To ensure that the states would not undo the federal
deregulation, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act,
prohibiting states from enforcing any law relating to rates,
routes, or services. 1 ' The court determined that the preemption of state law claims for infliction of emotional distress or
from claims arising from conduct alleged to be the product of
discriminatory motives would do nothing to promote the purposes of the ADA. 132 As a result, the court held that the plaintiffs claims were not preempted.133
In Hannibal v. FederalExpress Corp., the plaintiff sought to recover for damage to musical equipment shipped via Federal Express.13 4 The plaintiff claimed that Federal Express breached
the agreement to deliver the goods the next day and to honor
insurance claims placed against the equipment for which additional value had been declared.' 3 5 Federal Express removed the
case to federal court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction.1"
The court noted that there was no federal question presented
on the face of the complaint, and pursuant to the well-pled complaint rule, there was no basis for removal. 13 7 While the court
noted that federal preemption by the ADA is ordinarily a defense, it did not appear on the face of the complaint as a defense, and therefore, did not authorize removal.1 3 8 The court
also noted that under the doctrine of complete preemption,
when Congress "so completely pre-empt[s] an area of law [so] as
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
130 Id. at *29.
131Id. at *29-30.
132Id. at *31-32.
133Id. at *32.
134 266 F. Supp. 2d 466, 468 (E.D. Va. 2003).
128
129

135

Id.

136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.

at 469.
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to display an intent to not merely preempt a certain amount of
state law, but also to transfer jurisdiction from state to federal
courts," then preemption may provide a basis for federal jurisdiction.139 The court noted that the ADA did not preempt all
state acts, but only those which affected rates, routes, or services. 4 ° As such, there was no complete preemption which
would form the basis of federal jurisdiction.14 1
In All World Professional Travel Services v. American Airlines, the
court denied American Airlines' motion to dismiss the complaint alleging causes of action under a state law breach of contract claim and a federal RICO claim. 4 2 All World was a travel
agency, which, in the months after the September 11 th tragedies, assisted American in processing refunds to passengers
whose travel was cancelled immediately after September 11 th.143
Shortly after September l1th, "American unilaterally claimed
that refund requests for passengers unable to travel as a result of
the September 11 th tragedies should not be processed through
the ARC [a clearinghouse through which funds are collected
from various travel agencies on behalf of carriers], but should
be sent directly to American instead." '4 4 "All World was unaware of American's purported change in policy, and continued
to process refunds through the ARC. Thereafter, American began issuing 'Debit Memos' (demands for money), charging All
World an 'administrative service charge' and 'penalty fee' of
$100 or $200 per ticket refunded through the ARC" and
processed by All World.'4 5
The court carefully considered the purposes of the ADA and
found the ADA was adopted to encourage development and to
obtain air transportation service based upon competitive market
forces.1 46 The court noted that the ADA retained a savings
clause to protect "the ability of states to control non-economic
matters concerning airlines within their borders." 147 All World
brought three state law claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. 48
139 Id.

Id. at 470.
Id.
142 282 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1172, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
143 Id. at 1164.
14-Id. at 1165.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1167.
147 Id. at 1167-68.
148 Id. at 1165.
140

141
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The court found that All World's breach of contract claim fell
under the scope of American Airlines v. Wolens, which held that
"Court enforcement of a private contract does not constitute 'a
State's' enactment or enforcement of law.' "149 The court found
that part of All World's breach of contract claim did, however,
derive from enactment of state law, specifically Virginia law,
which held that the amount American charged in the Debit
Memos constituted a penalty prohibited by Virginia law.1 5 ° The
court went on to determine that All World's breach of contract
claim on the basis of unjust enrichment and claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as stated, did not relate to American's
prices or services, and therefore, were not preempted by the
ADA.15 1
C.

BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

In Kings Choice Neckwear, Inc., v. DHL Airways, the court considered whether the ADA would give rise to federal question jurisdiction supporting removal.1 52 The plaintiffs originally
brought this case in the state court of New York "on behalf of a
proposed class of individuals who received packages shipped
from abroad" via DHL.15 3 The plaintiffs alleged that DHL
"charged... some recipients of international packages an undisclosed and unauthorized 'Processing Fee' and [sought] damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of New York
GeneralBusiness Law §349 (deceptive business practices), breach
of contract, and unjust enrichment."'5 4 DHL "removed the action to federal court asserting diversity and federal question
jurisdiction. "155

The plaintiffs moved for remand, which was ultimately denied
by the court on the basis that there did not appear to be more

than $75,000 in damages claimed, thereby preventing diversity
jurisdiction.156 The court noted that, "[i]n determining
whether a claim arises under federal law, the court 'examines
the "well pleaded" allegations of the complaint and ignores po149 Id. at 1168 (quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228-29
(1995)).
150 Id. at 1168-69.
151 Id. at 1171-72.
152 No. 9580, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17507, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2003).
153 Id. at *1.
154

Id.

155

Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *11.

156
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tential defenses."' 15 7 Federal question jurisdiction exists only if
it is presented on the face of the complaint.1 5 "[A] defense relying on the preemptive effect of a federal statute does not normally provide a basis for removal" except in "cases in which
Congress has either expressly provided that a preempted state
claim be removed to federal court . . .or, in which a federal
statute has been held to wholly displace the state-law cause of
action through so called 'complete preemption'. ' 159 The court
noted that the Supreme Court has only found complete preemption to apply in three contexts: the Labor Management Relations Act, the Employer Retirement Income Security Act, and
the National Bank Act.16 0 The court noted that, while the ADA
"may provide a defense to plaintiffs [sic] state-law claims,...
[no] provision of the ADA expressly create [d] federal question
jurisdiction or provide[d] that state claims relating to the ADA
161
may be removed to federal court.
1.

Air TransportationSafety & System StabilizationAct

In CanadaLife Assurance Co. v. Coverium Riickversicherung,a Canadian Reinsurer sued a German Reinsurer in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.' 6 2 Jurisdiction was to be based upon Section 408 (B) (3) of the Air Transportation Safety & Stability Act.1 63 The District Court dismissed
6
The Second Circuit rethe action for lack of jurisdiction.
16 5
novo.
de
decision
viewed the
The court noted that the Act has five principal titles. 166 "Titles I, II, III, and V provide financial and tax relief to the airline
industry, including federal support for airline insurance, and affirm the President's decision to spend $3 billion [on getting reSection
elected; just kidding] on airline safety and security. '
408(b) has two jurisdictional provisions. 168 Section 408 (b) (3)
provides that the District Court of the Southern District of New
157 Id.

at *5 (quoting Ben Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003)).

159
160
161

*6.
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8-9.

162

335 F.3d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 2003).

163

Id. at 55.
Id.

158

164

Id. at

165 Id.

167

Id.
Id.

168

Id.

166
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York has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions
brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of property,
personal injury, or death) resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001. '"169 Plaintiff alleged its losses increased as a result of 9/11 and that the
defendant failed to honor its reinsurance (or retrocession)
agreement. 170 The plaintiffs losses would not have occurred

"but-for" 9/11.171
The court held that, while plaintiffs losses increased due to
9/11, that did not constitute a "claim" under the Act. 172 The
court noted that no fact concerning 9/11 needed to be adjudicated in the Act and that the cause of plaintiffs increased losses
was irrelevant. 173 The only issue was that plaintiffs incurred
losses that were not shared by the defendant per the agreement. 1 74 The court commented that Congress could not have
possibly intended every lawsuit traceable to 9/11 to be brought
in the Southern District of New York. 175 The court limited its
76
decision to that line of cases and affirmed the dismissal.'
2.

General Aviation Revitalization Act

In Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., survivors and successors
of victims sued to recover for damages from the crash of a Bell
helicopter based upon negligence, strict products liability, warranty, and fraud. 177 The trial court granted Bell's motion for
summary judgment based upon the eighteen year statute of repose set forth in the General Aviation Revitilization Act
78
(GARA).1
On appeal, the court considered whether any exceptions applied. 179 The helicopter, a model 205A-1, was originally sold in
1976.180 The tail rotor yoke was the original equipment from
169 Id. at 55-56 (citing Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,
H.R. 2926, 107th Cong. § 408(b)(3) (2001) (enacted)).
170 Id. at 57.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 58.
173 Id. at 57.
174 Id. at 53.
17- Id. at 58.
176 Id. at 59-60.
177 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2003).
178 Id.; Pub. L. No. 103-289, as amended by Pub. L. No. 105-102 § 3(e), 111
Stat. 2215, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2004) [hereinafter GARA].
179 Butler, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764-65.
180 Id. at 765.
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the manufacturer.'"' The plaintiff alleged Bell misrepresented
and withheld a variety of information from the FAA: first, in
1989, when it revised the helicopter's maintenance manual to
increase the operational life of the tail rotor yoke from 4,000 to
5,000 flight hours; later in 1996, when it revised the manual to
require a new dimensional test for inspection of the yoke; and
finally, throughout a ten-year period in which it failed to report
at least five accidents involving in-flight fatigue failures of rotors
that had less than 2,400 hours of use. 1 82 The appellate court
held that part 21.3(a) of the FAA's regulations put an affirmative duty on Bell to report the military failures of the identical
yokes.' 3 Bell's failure to report such to the FAA fell within
GARA's exception arising from withholding information from
8 5
the FAA.' 8 4 The summary judgment was reversed.
In Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., the widow of a helicopter
pilot sued for wrongful death on theories of strict product liability, negligence, and warranty.' 8 6 The accident occurred during
a fire-fighting mission.'8 7 Just before the accident, the pilot,
who had extensive helicopter experience, called on the radio
that he had a "flame-out."'8 8 The Bell 206 has a turbine engine
and fuel system consisting of three tanks. 8 9 The engine feeds
from only one tank and is automatically replenished from the
other two."' The helicopter had a history of flame-outs due to
problems with the fuel system failing to transfer fuel to the main
tank. 9 1 A system retrofit designed to make the system more reliable was issued in 1982, and the modification became
mandatory per a 1989 Airworthiness Directive. 19 2 Plaintiff argued that the fuel system was defective and that the 1982 retrofit
made the whole fuel system subject to GARA's rolling statute of
limitation.' 9 3 Defendant alleged that the replacement of a few
components did not start a new limitation period for the whole
181

Id.

182

Id.

183

Id. at 770.

184

186

Id.; GARA supra note 178, § 2(b) (1), 2(a), 3(3).
Butler, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 774-75.
4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2003).

187

Id. at 252.

188

Id.

185

189 Id.

19oId. at 252-53.
191 Id. at 254.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 256.
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system, only the components replaced."' Defendant appealed
the adverse jury verdict. 9 5 While the appellate court agreed
that GARA's rolling statute only applied to the components replaced, and not the fuel system as a whole, it found substantial
evidence to support the jury's1 finding
that one of the new com6
1
accident.
the
caused
ponents
V. WARSAW CONVENTION
A.

STANDING TO SUE

In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, the Second Circuit addressed the following issues: (1) whether the subrogee of the owner of goods had standing under the Warsaw
Convention 9 ' to bring an action against the carriers consisting
of two freight forwarders and Alitalia as the air carrier and (2)
whether the contract for carriage between the parties was one
which included ground transportation incidental to the transportation by air, or whether the ground transportation was a distinct leg in the instance of combined carriage. 8 Alitalia alleged
that Commercial Union lacked standing to sue as its insured was
not in privity of contract with Alitalia."'9 The court carefully analyzed the Warsaw Convention as well as the facts of the case and
noted that the freight forwarders considered themselves to be
agents of Alitalia. 200 Based on the foregoing, the court determined that a contract with the freight forwarders, as agents of
Alitalia, constituted a contract between the owner of the goods
and Alitalia. 2°1 Since Commercial Union stood in the shoes of
its insured as a subrogee, it had standing to bring suit under the
Convention against Alitalia. 2
Alitalia also argued that the contract between the parties was
one of successive transportation in accordance with Article 31 of
the Convention, and therefore that Commercial Union had the
194

195

Id.
Id. at 252.

J96 Id. at 258.
197 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 405105 (West 2004) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
198 347 F.3d 448, 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2003).
199Id. at 457-58.
200 Id. at 462.
201 Id. at 463.
202

Id. at 463-64.
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burden of proving the damage to the cargo took place during
the air carriage portion of the shipment.2 °3 Commercial Union
argued that the transportation was one principally of transportation by air with incidental land carriage in accordance with Article 18 of the Convention.2 °4 Under Article 18, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the damage occurred during that
portion of the shipment that occurred by air.2 °5 In this case, the
goods were shipped from Italy and received at JFK Airport.20 6
There was no apparent damage to the container, and the air
waybill was accepted with the goods being in good condition at
JFK. 2°7 The goods were then shipped to Commercial Union's
insured via ground transportation and were again received in
apparent good condition until after the container was opened,
20 8
and the goods were discovered to be damaged.
The court found that although there was no provision for

ground transportation on the air waybill, "people often expect
door-to-door delivery, a service that is simply not possible without the aid of transportation other than aircraft.

'2 9

The court

further found that the presumption of damage during the carriage by air was a provision inserted in the Convention to avoid
the precise question before the court, namely, when the damage
occurred. 210 Finally, the court found that, while the presumption may be a hardship on carriers, there was also a concession
granted in exchange for the limitation of liability carriers enjoy
under the Warsaw Convention. 21 The court found that "the important factor in applying presumptive liability is not whether
the air carrier itself has agreed to delivery, but simply whether
the carrier is party to any contract for air carriage that contemplated delivery by another means.

21

2

Here it found that there

was no way that the goods could have been delivered in accordance with the air waybill without carriage by land and, as such,
such land carriage was incidental to the carriage by air. 21 3' As a
result, the court found that the damage to the cargo presump-

209

Id. at 464.
Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 18).
Id.; Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 18.
Commercial Union Ins., 347 F.3d at 456.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 465.

210

Id.

211

Id. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 467.

203
204
205
206
207
208

212

213
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tively occurred during the flight. 214 As far as the receipts indicating no damage at JFK Airport, the court noted that, while
"[r]eceipt by the person entitled to delivery . . . without complaint [is] prima facie evidence" of delivery in good condition,
"[w] ithout inspection, however, such a statement could only apply to apparent damage. '2 15 The court also noted that the Convention allows "a seven-day time period in which a party entitled
to delivery may complain of damage to a shipment."21 ' Here the
court found that the damage was timely reported and that the
notation on the air waybills of receipt in good condition was not
2 17
controlling.

B.

EFFECT ON SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

In Albingia Versicherungs A.G. v. Schenker International,Inc., the
Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision concerning
the applicability of the Warsaw Convention2 1 8 and the federal
court's jurisdiction to consider state law claims. 219 "Siemens, a
German manufacturer, made computer chips in Singapore, and
sent them to San Jose, California, for testing. '221 When the cartons containing the boxes of computer chips were sent back to
Siemens' factory in Singapore after testing, some of the containers contained a brick instead of the circuits. 22 ' The value of the
circuits was $235,000.222 "Siemens had purchased insurance
from Albingia Versicherungs, which paid Siemens about
$235,000 for the stolen chips [and then] brought this subrogation claim against all the firms in the shipping chain" in the
California state court alleging claims under the Warsaw Convention and state law claims. 223 "Eva Air, an international air carrier, removed the case to federal court based on the Warsaw
Convention claim. '2 24 After discovery, all but one defendant settled.22 5 Schenker, a freight forwarder, operated a warehouse in
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

Id. at 468.
Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 26(1)).
Id.
Id.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 197.
344 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 934.
Id.

222 Id.
223
224
225

Id.
Id.
Id.
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California located outside the airport.226 "Siemens' [air] waybills contained a limitation of liability supplementing . . . the
Warsaw Convention. ' 227 In the event that the Warsaw Convention was found not to apply, then there was a limit of $20.00 per
kilogram for damage. 228 The parties eventually stipulated to
facts which strongly supported the inference that the computer
chips were stolen by Schenker's employees, and, as such, that
the loss occurred outside of the airport. 229 As a result, the Warsaw Convention would not apply.23 ° When the district court
held that the limitation in the air waybill of $20.00 per kilogram
was effective, the plaintiff then argued that the case should have
been remanded to state court because the basis for federal jurisdiction, the Warsaw Convention, no longer applied. 2 1 The circuit court held that, when jurisdiction was originally invoked in
federal court under the Warsaw Convention, the court had supplemental jurisdiction to hear and decide the state law claims.2 32
That jurisdiction did not end once the Warsaw Convention was
found to be inapplicable. 23 3 Albingia argued that state law
should apply to its claim and that California law precluded the
$20.00 per kilogram limitation. 2 4 The court held that federal
common law applied and, "[u]nder federal common law, the
limit on liability is valid ... if the shipper has reasonable notice
235
of it and a fair opportunity to purchase the means to avoid it."
Here the court found that Siemens was on notice of the limita236
tion as it had purchased insurance to cover its potential loss.
Based on the foregoing, the private $20.00 per kilogram limita23 7
tion contained in the waybill was enforceable.
C.

WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ACCIDENT

In Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, the Second Circuit reviewed a summary judgment granted in favor of Lufthansa
wherein the district court held that light or moderate turbu226

Id.

227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.

at 935.
231 Id. at 934-35.
232 Id. at 936.
230 Id.

233 Id.

234 Id.

at 939.

235 Id.

236 Id. at 939-40.
237 Id. at 940.

370

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

lence could not constitute the basis for an "accident" under the
Warsaw Convention.2 38 In this case, the plaintiff was returning
to his seat after the captain had announced that the aircraft may
encounter turbulence.23 9 While the pilot characterized the turbulence as light or moderate, the plaintiff had difficulty maintaining his balance and only made it to his seat by holding onto
other seatbacks as he progressed down the aisle. 24" The aircraft
on which he flew had a center fuel tank that protruded into the
passenger cabin, providing a ceiling height of only 6'3" at one
point. 24 1 Plaintiff was 6'4" tall. 242 As the plaintiff approached
the protrusion, something caused him to violently strike his
head on it, breaking his nose, dislodging a dental bridge, and
causing his vision to blur and nose to bleed. 24 3 Plaintiff was able
to make it back to his seat. 24 4 Plaintiff subsequently filed suit
against Lufthansa seeking recovery for his injuries under Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention. 24 5 Lufthansa moved for summary
judgment arguing that mild to moderate turbulence is an expected part of normal flight and, therefore, could never meet
the definition of an "accident" as defined in Air France v. Saks.24 6
According to Saks, an accident is an "unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to the passenger. '247 The
circuit court noted that the plaintiffs witnesses described the
turbulence to be more severe than that described by the pilot
and also noted the Supreme Court's comment in Saks, that in
"cases where there is contradictory evidence, it is for the trier of
fact to determine whether an 'accident' as here defined caused
the passenger's injury.1248 The circuit court rejected the district
court's decision that light or moderate turbulence could never
constitute an accident and reversed the grant of summary
249
judgment.
In another case where the courts wrestled with what constitutes an "accident," the United States District Court for the East238339 F.3d 158, 159 (2d Cir. 2003); Warsaw Convention, supra note 197.

Id. at 160.
Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 160-61; see Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
247 Magan, 339 F.3d at 161 (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
248 Id. at 162, 165 (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
249 Id. at 166.
239
240
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ern District of New York dealt with the carrier's and plaintiffs
opposing motions for summary judgment on whether the plaintiffs injury constituted an accident under the Warsaw Convention.2 5 ° In Girard the plaintiff was injured while exiting a bus
that had transported her from the terminal to the aircraft. 25 1 As
the plaintiff stepped from the bus, she lost her balance and fell,
allegedly incurring injuries. 25 2 American argued that an accident under the Convention must be a risk that is characteristic
of air travel.2 53 Since the plaintiff fell from a bus, American argued it was not a risk inherent to air travel. 25 4' The court reviewed various post-Saks cases and noted there were two lines of
opinions on the definition of an "accident," one broadly construing the term and the other doing so narrowly.2 5 5 Following
Fulop v. Malev HungarianAirlines, the court noted the conflicting
cases showed a decisive pattern: "the extent to which the circumstances giving rise to the accident fall within the causal purview
or control of the carrier-or at least within its practical ability to
influence-as an aspect of the operations of the aircraft or airline. ' 256 After analyzing the Warsaw Convention and the definition of "accident" as set forth in Saks, 2 5 7 supra, the court
determined that, while it was clear that the plaintiff was within
the control of the carrier and, therefore, was in the process of
embarking or disembarking, whether or not her falling from the
bus was an accident as considered by the Warsaw Convention
was an issue to be determined by the trier of fact (the jury).251
In Miller v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the court addressed
whether or not the Warsaw Convention applied to plaintiffs'
claims for deep vein thrombosis (DVT) as a result of the seating
configuration of the aircraft.2 5 9 Plaintiffs brought claims under
the Warsaw Convention and various state law claims including
claims for product negligence, common carrier negligence,
250 Girard v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 00-CV-4559, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506,
at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2003).
251

Id.

at *1.

252 Id. at *2-3.
253 Id. at *19.
254 Id.
255 Id.

256 Id. at *21-22 (citing Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F. Supp. 2d 651,
657 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
257 See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
258 Girard, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506, at *31.
259 260 F. Supp 2d 931, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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product liability, and breach of warranty. 260 The court, following the Supreme Court's opinions in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tseng,261' and Saks, supra, held that the plaintiffs' state law claims
were barred on the basis of complete preemption under the
Warsaw Convention.2 6 2 The court also considered the application of the Convention to loss of consortium claims and noted
that "the Convention extends to claims by non-passengers based
on events during international air travel" and that its application
is not merely personal to claims made by passengers. 63 As a
result, the court held that loss of consortium claims by a nonpassenger are subject to the Convention.2 6 4
In Scala v. American Airlines, Inc., the court considered
whether providing the plaintiff with an alcoholic beverage, as
opposed to the non-alcoholic beverage requested, could constitute an accident that would allow recovery under the Warsaw
Convention.2 6 5 Plaintiff was on an international flight and requested a glass of cranberry juice, but was instead served and
consumed cranberry juice with alcohol.2 6 6 As a result of the
mix-up, the plaintiff allegedly "suffered physical injury to his
heart. '267 The plaintiff suffered from a preexisting heart condition. 268 A suit was filed in state court and removed by American
Airlines. 26 9 Thereafter, American moved for judgment on the
pleadings on the basis that the plaintiffs claims did not constitute an accident under the Warsaw Convention. 27 0 The court
decided that the provision of an alcoholic beverage when one
was not requested constituted an "unexpected or unusual event
or happening that is external to the passenger. '27 1 American
in
argued that in order to qualify as an "accident" the event 272
question must "arise out of a risk that is peculiar to air travel.
The court determined that the characteristics of air travel in260 Id. at 933.
261 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
262 Id. at 937.
263 Id. at 940.

264 Id. at 941; see also Diaz Lugo v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 373 (D.P.R.
1988).
265 249 F. Supp. 2d 176, 177 (D. Conn. 2003).
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270

Id.

271 Id. at 179-180 (applying Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985)).
272 Id. at 180.
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creased the plaintiff's vulnerability to a mistaken drink substitution and that such constituted an "accident" as defined under
273
the Convention.
Recently, a New York district court was asked to determine
whether or not a carrier's response to an in-flight medical emergency constituted an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention. 2 74 In Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, plaintiffs brought
suit for injuries allegedly sustained during an international
flight. 2 75 Mr. Fulop had a prior history of a heart attack in
1994.276 During this 1998 flight, the plaintiff began to experience chest pains similar to what he recalled having experienced
when he had his prior heart attack.277 He made one request to
Malev's flight crew for assistance who then made an announcement requesting a physician.2 78 An orthopedic surgeon, who
was not a heart specialist, was onboard and examined the plaintiff.279 During the initial checkup and several follow up checkups, the doctor noted that the plaintiffs pulse rate, blood
pressure, and other indicia of a heart attack were normal.28 °
The doctor gave the plaintiff an injection of pain killer from the
281
flight's medical kit, which seemed to alleviate the symptoms.
As a result, this flight from Budapest to New York was not diverted. 21 2 Shortly after landing in New York, plaintiff began experiencing increased pain again and, upon arrival, an
ambulance took him to a hospital where he received a triple
bypass two days later. 2 3 Plaintiff alleged that had the flight
been diverted, it would have allowed him to obtain medical
treatment which would have avoided the permanent damage he
incurred as a result of the delay in obtaining medical treatment.28 4 The court, at a bench trial, noted that the carrier had
followed its own procedures for dealing with in flight medical
emergencies and that those procedures were consistent with in273

Id. at 181.

Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 244 F. Supp. 2d 217, 218 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
275 Id.
274

276

Id. at 219.
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Id.
Id.
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280

Id.
Id.

282

Id.
Id.
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Id. at 219-20.
Id. at 220.
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dustry standards. 2 5 As a result, the court found that the greater
weight of the evidence did not support a finding that an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention had occurred and entered
judgment for the carrier.28 6

D.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A SINGLE OPERATION

In Robertson v. American Airlines, Inc., plaintiff brought suit
seeking recovery for thermal burns incurred during a flight.2 7
The plaintiff had been using an ice pack which had become
warm and she asked the flight attendant to cool it.28 8 The flight
attendant placed the bag inside an airsickness bag with a piece
of dry ice. 28 The plaintiff lived and worked in Virginia and she
originally booked her flight with British Airways from Denver to
London leaving on September 2nd and returning on September
8th. 29" Three days later, she booked a roundtrip American Airlines flight from Washington, D.C. to Denver leaving on August
29th and returning on September 8th.29 1 Plaintiff left on her
trip as planned, but made several changes to her return arrangements.2 9 2 Ultimately, she ended up returning on September
10th via a British Airways flight from London to Denver, and
after spending three hours in the Denver airport, she took the
American Airlines flight from Denver to Washington, D.C. via
Chicago.2 9 3 It was on the Denver/Chicago leg of the flight that
the plaintiff sustained her burns.29 4 Plaintiff brought suit three
2 5
years after the incident.
American Airlines alleged that the flight was part of a single
operation of international travel and, therefore, subject to the
limitations of the Warsaw Convention, including the two-year
statute of limitations.2 9 6 In determining whether this was domestic carriage or part of a singular operation of international
carriage, the court reviewed Article One of the Warsaw Convention and noted that the carriage would be deemed to be one
at 221.
at 222.
287 277 F. Supp. 2d 91, 93 (D.D.C. 2003).
288 Id. at 95 n.6.
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undivided transportation if it had been regarded by the parties
as a single operation.2 9 7 The court noted that travelers are unlikely to consider the question of whether the transportation was
a single operation and, as a result, the courts used an objective
standard to determine the party's intent based upon specific
documentary indicia. 29 8 Based upon the foregoing, the court
held the travel was a single operation, that the Convention applied to the Denver/Chicago flight, and that the Convention's
two-year statute of limitation barred plaintiff's claim. 29 9

E.

EMBAREKNG AND DISEMBARING

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
considered what constituted "embarking" in Kalantar v. Lufthansa German Airlines. °° In this case, the plaintiff, an Iranian
traveling with an Iranian passport, was in the process of checking in to depart the United States on a trip to Germany. 0 1
Upon arriving at the ticket counter, the agent wanted to search
the plaintiffs baggage that was being checked onto the aircraft. 0 2 In response to the plaintiffs request as to why his luggage had to be searched when no one else's luggage was being
searched, the agent only said that it was due to an FAA security
3 03
directive but refused to disclose the directive to the plaintiff.
The agent also told the plaintiff, within earshot of other passengers, that he "must know that the United States Government is
against all Iranians. '' 30 4 When the plaintiff refused to leave the
Lufthansa counter and refused to allow the hand search of his
luggage, Lufthansa's personnel called the police who eventually
arrested the plaintiff and took him away in handcuffs. 5 Plaintiff filed suit, alleging discrimination, defamation, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.30 6
Lufthansa alleged plaintiffs state law claims were preempted by
the Warsaw Convention. 0 7 The court carefully reviewed many
cases dealing with what constitutes "embarking," and this case
297 Id. at 96 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 1 (3)).
298

Id. at 96-97.

299

Id. at 100.

300

276 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2003).
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Id.
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305 Id.
306 Id.
307Id. at 7, 9.
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provides an excellent summary of same.30 8 The court noted that
courts have generally focused on: "(1) the passenger's location
at the time of the injury; (2) the passenger's activity at the time
of the injury, and (3) the degree of control exercised by the
airline over the passenger" at the time of the injury in order to
ascertain whether or not it occurred during the process of embarking.30 9 With regard to the plaintiff's physical location, the
court found that his placement at the ticket counter prior to
being checked in and prior to receiving a boarding pass was too
remote from the actual process of getting on a specific aircraft
to constitute embarking.3 10 Secondly, the court found that the
plaintiff, checking in approximately an hour and a half prior to
the flight's departure time was too distant, temporally, to constitute embarking. 1 1 The court also found that plaintiff was just
completing his initial check-in, which was the first of several
steps a passenger must take prior to boarding an aircraft. 2 Finally, the court noted that had the check-in procedure proceeded smoothly, the plaintiff would have been released to the
public area of the airport, as opposed to a secured area reserved
for passengers only.31 3 Finding that the plaintiff was not in the
process of embarking, the court denied the defendant's motion
for partial summary judgment seeking application of the War314
saw Convention to the plaintiffs case.
In Chips Plus, Inc. v. FederalExpress Corp., plaintiff sought recovery for damage to some computer parts.3 5 The parts were
shipped from Finland to Warrington, Pennsylvania, which was
where the damage to the cargo was discovered. 6 The total loss
was alleged to be $117,715.77 The main issue before the court
was the difference between the Warsaw Convention, as originally
drafted, and its amendment under Montreal Protocol 4
(MP4)."33 Under the amended Warsaw Convention, a party as308
309
310
311
312

See id. at 10-12.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
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Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
281 F. Supp. 2d 758, 760-61 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
Id. at 760.
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serting jurisdiction must only show: "(1) that the goods at issue
where [sic] shipped via international transportation by aircraft;
(2) that, at the time the goods were shipped, the country of destination and the country from which the goods were shipped
were signatories to the Amended Warsaw Convention; and (3)
that the damage to the goods in question occurred during carriage by air. 31 9 The court noted that MP4 created a rebuttable
presumption that the damage to goods took place during the
carriage by air, and as a result of the presumption, all requirements for jurisdiction and application of the Convention were
met. 20 Plaintiff attempted to avoid the Convention by alleging
that there were errors in the air waybill that did not conform
with the requirements of Articles 5 through 8 of the Convention. 32 1 The court noted that an additional difference between
MP4 and the original Convention was that, under the original
Convention, if a carrier accepted goods without the air waybill
having been made out and containing the requirements contained in Article 8, the carrier was not entitled to avail itself of
the limitations of the Convention. 2 2 However, under MP4,
"[n]on-compliance with the provisions of Articles 5 to 8 [do]
not affect the existence or the validity of the contract for car323
riage . .. including those relating to limitation of liability.
In the following case, the Southern District of New York considered whether or not adoption of MP4 necessarily resulted in
the U.S.'s adoption of the Hague Protocol.3 24 In Royal & Sun
Alliance Insurance v. American Airlines, Inc., the question was important because, under the Hague Protocol, there is no requirement to include agreed stopping places on the air waybill in
order to allow the carrier to avail itself of the limitations of the
Convention. 25 The U.S. had never formally adopted the Hague
28 September 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in Sec. Rep. No.
105-20 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 4 or MP4].
319 Chips Plus, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 762-63.
320 Id. at 763 (citing Montreal Protocol, supra note 318 art. 18(5)).
321 Id. at 764 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 5-8).
322 Id.
323 Id. at 764-65.
324 Royal & Sun Alliance Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929,
opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague
Protocol].
325 Royal & Sun, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
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Protocol. 326

However, the court carefully reviewed MP4 and
noted that Article XVII (2) of MP4 states "[r]atification of this
Protocol by any State which is not a party to the Warsaw Convention as amended at the Hague, 1955, shall have the effect of
accession to the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague,
1955 and by the Protocol No. 4 of Montreal, 1975."327 On July
31, 2002, President George W. Bush sent a letter to the Senate
"for advice and consent for the proposition that the United
States could not have been bound by the Hague Protocol before
that date. '328 Plaintiffs argued that the letter indicated that the
U.S. had not formally adopted the Hague Protocol and also
noted that the U.S. is not on the list at the Polish Embassy as
ratifying the Hague Protocol.129 The court dispelled these
points and noted that, while the U.S. being listed in Poland
would clarify the point, the language contained in MP4 was sufficient to show that the U.S. adopted the Hague Protocol by
adopting MP4 3 °

F.

WHAT CONSTITUTES CARRIAGE BY AIR

In Fuller v. Amerijet International Inc., the Southern District
Court of Texas considered whether significant carriage by land,
during which loss to goods occurred, was part of carriage by air
so as to fall under the Warsaw Convention. 3 1 In this case, the
plaintiff contracted with Amerijet to transport a computer and
home theater equipment from Houston to Belize City by air.3 2
Plaintiff delivered the goods to Amerijet's warehouse at Houston's Bush Airport.33 Amerijet then hired Land Cargo to truck
the goods from Houston to Miami and Land Cargo delivered
the goods to Amerijet's warehouse at Miami International Airport.334 However, at that point the goods disappeared. 33 5 The
court found that, "[u] nder the convention, transportation by air
includes the entire period in which the air carrier is in charge of
336
the goods-not simply the time the goods are on the airplane.
326

Id.

at 268.

327 Id. at 267.
328 Id. at 268.
329 Id.
330 Id.

33,273 F. Supp. 2d 902 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
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335Id. at 903.
336

Id.

2004 AVIATION CASE LAW UPDATE

2004]

379

Since it was "directly related to Amerijet's contractual obligation
to ship," the court held that the land carrier was the air carrier's
sub-bailee and that the loss of the goods in Miami constituted a
loss under the Convention. v As a result, the court granted
Amerijet's motion for summary judgment limiting its liability to
$20.00 per kilogram (i.e. "$9.07 per pound").338
G.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In Pennington v. British Airways, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed the issue of when the two-year statute of limitations under the Warsaw
Convention 339 would expire and whose law would be utilized in
making that determination. a In this case, the plaintiff originally filed suit in Pennsylvania, and British Airways removed the
case on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 34 1 The plaintiffs injury occurred on July 13, 2000, when the plaintiff suffered a
stroke on an international flight with British Airways.34 2 Plaintiff
alleged that British Airways failed to provide appropriate medical treatment.34 3 Suit was filed on July 15, 2002. 3 11 Under Pennsylvania rules, whenever the last day of any limitation period falls
on a Saturday or Sunday, such day is omitted from the computation.3 4 5 "[B] ecause July 13, 2002 was a Saturday, [under Pennsylvania law,] the action was timely filed on the following
Monday, July 15, 2002. ,,346 British Airways argued that the two
year statute of limitations in the Convention could not be extended by local law and, therefore, the failure to file the suit
prior to July 13 barred the action. 4 7 The court, reviewing Article 29 of the Convention, noted that the "method of calculating
the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the
court" in which the suit is filed. 343 As a result, the court held
that Pennsylvania law was applicable and that the complaint was
337
338

Id.
Id.

339Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 29.
340 275 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
341 Id. at 602.
342
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343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id.
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Id.

347 Id.
348 Id.

at 604.

380

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN) COMMERCE

timely filed.3 49 This opinion includes citations to the drafting
history of the Warsaw Convention and bears closer examination
if this issue is present in your case.
H.

WILLFUL MISCONDUCT

In Mendez & Diaz v. American Airlines, Inc., the Southern Dis-

trict Court of New York considered the question of whether willful misconduct constitutes an exception to the application of
the Warsaw Convention, thereby destroying federal jurisdiction. 5° This case dealt with two complaints filed originally in
Texas against American Airlines and others as a result of the
November 12, 2001 American Airlines Flight 587 crash in Belle
Harbor, New York."' The flight was bound for Santo Domingo
in the Dominican Republic, and crashed shortly after takeoff,
resulting in the deaths of all passengers and crew members
onboard. 52 American, during the time it was the sole defendant (Airbus Industries and others were also named), timely removed the action to federal court.3 5 3 Thereafter, plaintiffs

moved to remand to state court, alleging that the removal was
defective because American failed to obtain the consent of all
other defendants and that the willful misconduct of American
constituted an exception to the application of the Warsaw Convention, thereby allowing the state law actions to survive.354 The
court noted that, at the time American removed the case to federal court, it was the only defendant and, therefore, was not required to obtain the consent of the other defendants. 55 In
analyzing the plaintiffs' motion for remand, the court noted
that the law puts the burden of demonstrating the existence of
removal jurisdiction on the party opposing the remand. 3 5

6

The

court noted that the "well-pleaded complaint rule" normally
would prevent the application of federal jurisdiction based on
an affirmative defense. 357 This allows the plaintiff to formulate

its complaint in a manner designed to avoid federal law if it
Id. at 606.
No. 02: Civ. 6746, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7540, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 5,
2003).
351 Id.
352 Id. at *2.
353 Id. at *4.
354 Id. at *4, 17.
355 Id. at *17.
356 Id. at *5.
357 Id. at *6.
349
350
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chooses.158 However, the court noted that the "complete preemption" doctrine would bar state law claims regardless of the
well-pleaded complaint rule.3 59 The court, noting the Supreme
Court's decision that the Warsaw Convention completely preempts state common law claims regarding personal injuries suffered during international air travel, held that there was federal
question jurisdiction over the matter. 6 ° Plaintiffs also argued
that the matter should be remanded because additional defendants, namely Airbus Industries, who was not a "carrier" as defined in the Warsaw Convention,3 6 were not covered by the
Warsaw Convention and, therefore, the state law claims continued to exist.3 62 The court, after analyzing the Convention and
noting that the term "carriers" does not make reference to
"manufacturers" of aircraft, nonetheless reviewed the Second
Circuit's holding that "the Warsaw Convention is to be construed as to further its purposes to the greatest extent possible,
even if that entails rejecting a literal reading. '36 3 The court, noting that a good argument could be made to include manufacturers under the Warsaw Convention, nonetheless chose to simply
grant supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law
claims against Airbus.3 6 4 Based on the foregoing, the motion to
remand was denied.3 6 5
I.

REQUIREMENTS FOR BAGGAGE CHECK

In the following case, the Eastern District Court of New York
was faced with the question of what constituted a baggage check
under the Warsaw Convention, 366 the requirements of same,
and the effect failure to comply with the requirements of the
Convention had upon the carrier's ability to limit its liability for
lost or damaged baggage. 6 7 In Schopenhauer, a passenger sued
Air France for baggage lost and damaged on international
358Id.
359 Id. at
360 Id. at

*6-7.
*9 (relying on El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999)).
361 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 197.
362

Mendez, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7540, at *14.

Id. at *15. (citing Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918
(2d Cir. 1978)).
363
364

Id.
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Id. at *18.

366 Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 22(2).
367 Schopenhauer v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 255 F. Supp. 2d 81
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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flights. 368 This case has a fairly long list and summary of numerous cases dealing with both the original Warsaw Convention and
the courts' interpretation of the Convention as modified by
MP4.36 9 It also looks to opinions from Canada and the United
Kingdom concerning the requirements of a baggage check
under the Hague Protocol as both have been signatories to the
Hague since the mid-1960s.3 70 The plaintiff was traveling from
New York to the Republic of Benin, with "a four-day stopover in
Paris on the way to Benin, and a 13-hour stopover in Paris on
the way back to New York." '7 1 When the plaintiff arrived to begin his trip in New York, he checked five bags and attempted to
carry on a sixth bag, but Air France required that he check it as
it was "too bulky. ' 372 Plaintiff was given a "limited release" identification tag in exchange for giving the sixth bag to the flight
attendant.3 73 When the flight arrived in Paris, the sixth bag did
not, and it did not turn up again until approximately six weeks
later, heavily looted. 7 The plaintiff alleged lost and damaged
items totaling $69,000 in that bag. 73 Also in the lost bag were
the plaintiffs tickets for his remaining itinerary.3 76 The plaintiff
was delayed in getting a replacement ticket and, when continuing his travel from Paris to Benin, checked six pieces of baggage.3 7 7 Unfortunately, when he arrived in Benin, "two of the
378
pieces were 'completely destroyed' and thoroughly looted.
Plaintiff alleged that the contents of those bags were valued at
approximately $2,200.3

7

1

Air France moved for summary judgment under the Warsaw
Convention and also moved to dismiss the part of the plaintiffs
claim relating to the damages incurred on the Paris to Benin
flight.3 8 0 The basis of the motion to dismiss was that, having issued replacement tickets to the plaintiff, a new contract for carriage was created and, therefore, New York no longer satisfied
368
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the requirements of the Convention as one of the jurisdictional
locales. 8 1 The court rejected this argument, noting that under
the Convention, international carriage could be through successive contracts of carriage without destroying the international
38 2
character of the flight.
Of greater interest was the court's handling of the requirements of the Warsaw Convention as to Air France's liability for
the sixth bag that was lost on the New York to Paris flight. 38 3
Under the original Convention, prior to its amendment by MP4,
a carrier could not limit its liability under the Convention unless
it issued a baggage check containing certain particulars, specifically, the ticket number of the passenger, the number and
weight of the baggage, and a statement that the transportation
was subject to the rules relating to the Convention. 4 Montreal
Protocol 4, which came into effect prior to this loss, however,
only requires an indication of the places of departure and destination (if the places of departure and destination are within a
single High Contracting Party), one or more agreed stopping
places in another state, and a notice to the effect that the Warsaw Convention may be applicable. 5 The "limited release"
given by Air France to the plaintiff for the sixth bag failed to
include the above requirements. 8 6 Because Air France did not
base its motion for summary judgment as to the application of
the Warsaw Convention to the loss of the sixth bag on the basis
that the requirements of the current Convention for the baggage ticket could be fulfilled by the information contained in
the passenger's ticket, the court did not grant Air France summaryjudgment as to the application of the Warsaw Convention
to that bag.3 8 y This opinion contains a detailed analysis of the
application of the current Convention and the utilization of the
passenger ticket and baggage ticket to constitute a single document meeting the requirements of the Convention as modified

by MP4.
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NOTIFICATION OF DAMAGE

In G.D. Searle & Co. v. FederalExpress Corp., the Northern District Court of California considered cross-motions for summary
judgment under the Warsaw Convention concerning damage to
cargo."' This case evidences the care that counsel involved in
these types of cases must take to ensure which version of the
Warsaw Convention properly applies to the case. While the
U.S.'s adoption of MP4 constitutes an adoption of the Hague
Protocol, counsel must nonetheless check to ensure that both
appropriate high contracting parties are signatories to the
Hague. 8 9 In this case, the plaintiff filed suit for damage to certain pharmaceutical goods which were transported from Germany to the United States.3 9 ' The shipment was supposed to
arrive within two days, but ended up taking slightly more than a
week.
When the goods were delivered by Federal Express in
California, many of the cartons were damaged resulting in plaintiffs claim that the entire shipment was destroyed. 9 2 As a preliminary matter, the court determined which version of the
Warsaw Convention applied to the proceedings.39 3 Thereafter,
it determined that the evidence of record was sufficient to support a jury finding that Federal Express' acts or omissions were
done with the intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result, as set forth in
Article 22 of the Hague. 9 4 This standard differs from the original Warsaw Convention which required the plaintiff to show
39 5
that the carrier engaged in willful misconduct.
Also of issue in the case was whether or not notice of claim
was timely made.39 6 The two entities involved in the shipment
from Germany were Federal Express and Union-Transport. 9 7
Under the Hague Protocol and the language contained in the
air waybill, the person entitled to delivery must complain to the
carrier promptly after discovery of the damage and in no case
388 248 F. Supp. 2d 905, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
389 See id. at 907.
390 Id. at 906.
391 Id.
392
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908-09 (citing Hague Protocol, supra note 324 art. 15).
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more than 14 days from date of receipt of the cargo. 98 Although the plaintiff in this case had timely informed Federal
Express of its claim, it did not send notice to Union-Transport
until nearly 6 weeks after receipt of the goods. 9 9 However,
since the air waybills provided that a written complaint could be
made "to the Carrier whose Air Waybill was used, or to the first
Carrier or to the last Carrier or to the Carrier who performed
the transportation during which the loss, damage or delay took
place," the court found that by notifying Federal Express in a
timely manner, plaintiff complied with its obligation to timely
notify Union-Transport.4 "'
VI.

DOMESTIC SHIPPING CASES

In Kesel v. United Parcel Service, Inc., plaintiff brought suit
against UPS seeking recovery for the value of lost paintings.4 " '
Plaintiff had selected seven paintings from studios in the
Ukraine for exhibition in San Francisco.40 2 Plaintiff asked his
assistant to ship the paintings to California through UPS, "to declare the paintings at $13,500 for U.S. customs purposes and to
insure them for $60,000, a figure based upon [plaintiffs] belief
that the paintings could be sold in the United States for $8,000
to $10,000 a piece.40 3 The assistant took the paintings to the
customs commission in Odessa as required by law.40 4 The commission determined that the works were not antique, and therefore assigned a value based on the cost of materials and
provided plaintiff's assistant with a permit listing the value of the
paintings as $558.405 When the assistant attempted to ship the
goods through UPS and insure them for $60,000, UPS refused
to insure them for more than the $558 value indicated on the
customs form.40 6 Nevertheless, the assistant shipped all seven
paintings in a single package.40 7 UPS's limitation of liability and
tariffs limited its liability to $100 per package.40 8 When the
paintings failed to show up in California, UPS was able to trace
398
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the paintings to their receipt and storage at a Kentucky warehouse, where they then "vanished like the Ark of the Covenant."4 9 Plaintiff sued UPS in a California court, alleging
numerous federal and state claims, and seeking $60,000 in damages for the loss of the paintings.4 10 UPS removed the case to
federal court.4 11 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of UPS and limited its liability to $558.412 The circuit
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, noting that federal common law "delineates what a carrier must do to limit its
liability."41 Under the "released valuation doctrine . . . in exchange for a low rate, the shipper is deemed to have released
the carrier from liability beyond a stated amount."4 4 In order
for UPS to take advantage of the doctrine, it must have provided
the plaintiff with, "(1) a reasonable notice of limited liability,
'
and (2) a fair opportunity to purchase higher liability."4 15
The
court found that the plaintiff was placed on notice of UPS's limitation and that UPS had provided the plaintiff with increased
coverage ($558 of coverage as opposed to $100 per container),
and therefore UPS complied with federal common law.4 16 The
court noted that UPS does not have carte blanche to impose
arbitrary valuations on property. 4 17 Here, the court noted that
UPS relied upon the customs documents setting the valuation of
the property.41 "
409
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